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PP 590 “The People” and the Media. On the Relationship Between Populist Attitudes and Media Use
L. Emmerling1, V. Geyer 1, L. Pfefferle1, J. Stange1, N. Fawzi1, M. Obermaier1, C. Reinemann1
1 Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Department of Communication Science and Media Research, Munich, Germany
Populist parties and movements are recently achieving a growing success all over Europe (Hartleb, 2011). So far, research on this topic has mainly dealt with
a theoretical conceptualization of populism, the causes for its success and its influence on the political system (Akkerman et al., 2014). However, there is
only limited evidence on the people who support those movements, the“populist citizens“. Also, studies that analyze these people with populist attitudes
mostly focus on their social demographics as well as their party preferences (Akkerman et al., 2014; Elchardus & Spruyt, 2012; Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde,
2012; Rooduijn, 2014; Stanley, 2011). However, since people with populist attitudes often seem to distrust the media, which may, for instance, affect the ex‑
posure to alternative media, analyzing the relationship between populist attitudes and media use is crucial (also see Tsfati, 2010; Tsfati & Capella, 2003;
Tsfati & Peri, 2006). Nevertheless, research on media consumption of populist citizens is rather rare. Hence, the aim of this study is to investigate whether
populist attitudes relate to specific patterns of media use and whether this media usage of citizens with populist attitudes differs from non-populist citizens.
To answer these questions we conducted a quantitative online survey of German citizens (n = 1007) in winter 2015. The questionnaire contained central
measures of political as well as populist attitudes, trust in media and media use (Akkerman et al., 2014; Rooduijn, 2014; Tsfati & Capella, 2003; Tsfati &
Peri, 2006). Results show that populist citizens have a lower trust in media than non-populist citizens. In detail, populist citizens proclaim lower trust in
mainstreammedia and higher trust in alternative media than people with non-populist attitudes. However, although people with populist attitudes rather
distrust mainstreammedia, they use them as often as people with non-populist attitudes. Yet, alternative media are mainly consumed by people with pop‑
ulist attitudes and rarely by non-populist citizens. In addition, people with populist attitudes more often specifically avoid consuming mainstream media
than people with non-populist attitudes. In particular, it is mainly the public-service broadcasting which is avoided by these populist citizens. Beyond that,
people with populist attitudes are more likely to actively participate in online media than people with non-populist attitudes, e.g., by writing comments,
sharing or posting articles on newspaper websites, in social media or on blogs. This is specifically important, since people with populist attitudes are using
social networks rather frequently. Also, the more often populist citizens participate in online media the more likely are social networks to become their main
source of political information. Altogether, the results demonstrate that populist attitudes and media consumption relate to each other in various ways.
The implications of these results will be discussed in detail at the conference.
PP 591 Populism in and by the Media: Six Paradoxes of Media Populism
B. Krämer1
1 LMU Munich, Department of Communication Studies and Media Research, Munich, Germany
Many countries in Europa have witnessed the rise (and sometimes also fall) of movements and parties that have been described as populist. Populist actors
have posed a challenge to established parties or even entered into government. However, only recently have communication and media scholars begun to
investigate the communicative aspects of populism. We still lack an encompassing framework that describes how populism is related to the media. Popu‑
lism is defined here as a (thin) ideology that consists to favor the perspective and interests of what is seen as a homogeneous, authentic majority ingroup
that is nonetheless construed as subaltern (“the people”) and that is opposed to other outgroups and a corrupt and conspiring elite. It is then demanded or
claimed that the will of this people should be directly implemented. This contribution discusses populism in and by the media, i.e., coverage by the mass
media that can be termed “populist” in different senses (the argument is mainly inspired by European right-wing populism but should remain as open as
possible to other forms of populism). It therefore contributes to the abovementioned aim by providing a typology of media populism and its relationships
with populist actors and attitudes. Different concepts and categorizations have been proposed in the literature to described types of media populism, such
as“news value populism”or“tabloid populism.”Reviewing previous research and complementing it with further aspects, a framework for the interpretation
and classification of media populism is developed. In the broadest sense, media can be “populist” in at least six ways that all have somewhat paradoxical
implications: 1. Fueling anti-elitism by routinely reporting negative incidents involving elites and by acting as democracy's fourth estate, even in a way
that undermines democracy. 2. Supplying “evidence” for populist constructions of outgroups by focusing on deviant behavior of outgroup members and
essentializing their identity. 3. Supplying catchwords, slogans and interpretive frameworks for populism—and anti-media populism (i.e., a general an‑
ti-elite attitude that involves hostility toward the media). 4. Responding to the news value and self-stylization of populist actors and providing a platform
to them. 5. Behaving as a substitute for populist leaders by selecting and interpreting issues from a distinct populist perspective and even claiming to
represent the people's true interests. 6. Providing platforms for participation and media criticism without responsivity, thus fostering anti-elite sentiment
toward the media and the political system. The contribution concludes with some remarks on the accomplishments and gaps of previous theory-building
and research, and on the practical implications of the argument outlined before.
PP 592 Wutbuerger2.0 (Enraged Citizen2.0) – A Quantitative Content Analysis of the Online Campaign of PEGIDA in a Digital Public
T. Evers1
1 Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Department of Journalism, Eichstaett, Germany
The Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident - in short PEGIDA - is a social movement of self-appointed concerned citizens trying to spin
their propaganda since the fall of 2014. Most recently, between 5000 and up to 20,000 people attended the PEGIDA demonstrations in various German
cities, especially in Dresden. The registered association has long been classified as a right-wing populist movement, but since the inflow of the refugees
keeps growing the message of the PEGIDA followers are getting openly xenophobic. Social Networks are the mouthpiece of the group, especially Facebook,
whereas the leadership renounces a website. By now, the Pegida fanpage on Facebook has more than 200,000 fans - and rising. It can be assumed that
digital publics offer some attractive advantages for the implementation of a campaign, especially for weakly institutionalized social is no