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609

Thursday, November 10

1 6 : 3 0 – 1 8 : 0 0

EPS01

Populist and Extremist Discourse in the EU: Creating Discontinuities and Reshaping Politics

A. Bârgăoanu

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National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania

Populism, nationalism and right-wing extremism are seeing a resurgence in a number of states across Europe, with consequences on the decision-making

process in the European Union. As it became a very familiar narrative in recent years, this phenomenon creates severe discontinuities from the previous

EU communication paradigm. The dangers associated with populism in the political discourse is that in order to meet the increasingly Eurosceptic public

opinion, the European leaders, in most cases, choose an antagonistic approach on the national interest as opposed to EU’s interest. Populist tendencies

are worth exploring in the light of EU’s multiple difficulties, the immigrant crisis being only the latest one. Multifaceted theoretical approaches have been

assigned in the last decades to the concept of“populism”. In an attempt to extract and isolate its unique characteristics, scholars have tried to understand it

in terms of expressed ideas, manifested style and formal organization. As proofs of European populist behaviour have never stopped being invoked both by

the literature and by the media, further contextualization is not only explainable, but also welcome.The popular mobilization that far right parties (through

political figures like Le Pen in France, Jobbik in Hungary or Berlusconi in Italy) have successfully determined adds new perspectives to the concept of pop‑

ulism. Searching for the lowest common denominator (Rooduijn, 2013) of these movements, Euroscepticism comes to the forefront of the national action.

Populism of the recent years, or the“new populism”(Canovan, 2006), finds in Euroscepticism one of the strongest arguments.The opposition towards the EU

has become the playground for populist actors, and the playground is getting larger with every missed step in action and communication made by the EU

institutions. In this context, the goal of the panel organised by the ECREATWG ”Communication and the European Public Sphere”is to encourage quality de‑

bate and reflection on key discursive practices employed by political actors and the media when discussing about the European Union and its multiple crises.

PN 142

The Making of a Populist Heartland – Data from PEGIDA's Facebook Profile Page

J. Rohgalf

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1

University of Rostock, Rostock, Germany

Social media provide the scholar of ideologies with an unprecedentedly rich source material documenting the political notions and sentiments of 'ordinary

citizens'. Especially studies in populism can gain enormously from this source. Populists claim to lend their voice to the authentic will of the people. Social

media allow for a glimpse at how this idealised 'heartland' (Taggart) is imagined and conceptualized by their supporters. More precisely, on Web 2.0 sites

the scholar can receive an impression how the 'heartland' is construed and negotiated in actu in the interactions between the populist and their supporters.

On a more abstract level, the style of communication typical of social media resonates with key features of populist communication (e.g. in terms of prox‑

imity, immediacy or allegedly spontaneous collective phenomena). The paper presents original research on the German case of the so-called 'Patriotische

Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes' (PEGIDA). Since October 2014, PEGIDA has been organizing weekly rallies in Dresden, attended by

several thousands. Besides a host of franchisees in other cities in Germany and abroad, PEGIDA is networking with right-wing populist parties through‑

out Europe. While openly xenophobic and anti-muslim, PEGIDA also acts as a projection screen for various resentments against the 'establishment' and

an asserted 'leftist zeitgeist'. An essential part of PEGIDA, beside the rallies and their coverage by mass media, takes place on Facebook. The social network

site serves as an organising tool and a means for cultivating 'affective economies' (Ahmed), but it is also the place where more than 100k users partake in

shaping the ideological blend which characterises PEGIDA. There is already a number of studies available which focus on the rallies. In contrast, research

on PEGIDA's social media communication is still in its infancy – all the more when it comes to interpreting the data in the light of the theory of populism.

The paper tackles this desideratum. After outlining a framework for semantic and metadata analysis, it discusses data from PEGIDA's Facebook page in terms

of populist communication. Especially, it focusses on how the exchange between the organising staff and supporters nurtures a particular, cognitive and

affective notion of 'heartland' and democracy.

PN 143

Populism as a Corrupted Democracy

J. Niżnik

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Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland

Observing democratic principles is clearly not enough to stop populism. The paper is aimed to answer the question ”Why is it so”? After brief overview and

criticism of definitions of populism used most often I argue for an understanding of this phenomenon as an instruments of manipulation applied to a po‑

litical discourse by extremists politicians, becoming their style of making politics. Although democratic procedures can be used by such politicians to obtain

high positions in politics, their further activities usually violate at least some of them. Further arguments of the paper show that behind the democratic

surface populism as a style of making politics is simply a form of corrupted democracy.

TWG – Communication

and the European Public Sphere

(EPS01)