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168

Thursday, November 10

1 6 : 3 0 – 1 8 : 0 0

CRC04

Crisis Response Strategies, Empathy, and Reputation

PP 262

Can Stakeholders’ Empathy with an Organization in Crisis Explain the Effectiveness of Crisis Response Strategies?

A.S. Claeys

1

, L. Schoofs

1

1

KU Leuven, Institute for Media Studies, Leuven, Belgium

According to Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) crisis managers should select crisis response strategies that allow them to accept as much

responsibility as is attributed by stakeholders (Coombs, 2007). New theoretical insights with regard to these crisis response strategies can be found in the lit‑

erature on interpersonal relationships, which stresses the importance of victims’empathy with a wrongdoer. McCullough, Worthington and Rachal (1997)

propose an empathy model of forgiveness, according to which people forgive others to the extent that they experience empathy for them. Their research

shows that when an offender apologizes to a victim for his or her misdeeds, the victim experiences increased empathy for the offender. As a consequence,

the victim is more likely to offer forgiveness. We conducted an experimental study (N = 123) to examine if the impact of crisis response strategies on

post-crisis reputation may be explained by their intermediate effect on stakeholders’empathy with an organization in crisis. A single factor between-sub‑

jects experimental design was conducted in order to compare the impact of apologies to a) the ‘reversed’ strategy of denial, b) expressing sympathy with

victims and c) a control condition. The findings first indicate that crisis response influences the amount of empathy (F(3, 119) = 3.676, p = .014). Consum‑

ers experience more empathy with an organization in crisis when the company offers an apology (M = 2.94, SD = 1.12) as compared to a deny strategy

(M = 2.05, SD = .95, p = .047). Expressing sympathy (M = 2.92, SD = 1.30, p = 1) and offering information only (M = 2.52, SD = 1.51, p = .32) about

the crisis (control condition) does not result in a different level of empathy. Because the difference between an apology and denial is that an apology allows

organizations to accept responsibility for the crisis, we examined if the impact of perceived responsibility acceptance on post-crisis reputation is mediated

by an increase in consumers’ empathy with the organization in crisis. The findings show that perceived responsibility acceptance significantly predicts

post-crisis reputation (β = .31, t [121] = 3.61, p < .001). Empathy also predicts reputation (β = .59, t [121] = 7.93, p <.001). When the independent vari‑

able and the mediator are regressed on the dependent variable, the impact of empathy on reputation is still significant (β = .56, t [120] = 6.72, p < .001).

The effect of perceived responsibility acceptance on reputation, however, becomes insignificant when empathy is added as mediator (β = .047, t [120] =

.56, p = .58). A Sobel test further supports the existence of a significant mediation of empathy (z= 4.74, p < .001). Empathy should therefore be taken into

consideration when examining and discussing the effects of organizational crisis communication. Coombs,W.T. (2007). Protecting organization reputations

during a crisis: The development and application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 163–176 McCullough,

M.E., Worthington, E.L., & Rachal, K.C. (1997). Interpersonal forgiving in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(2), 321–336.

PP 263

Steering Disaster – Impact of Strategic Crisis Communication on Media Coverage After the Germanwings Plane Crash in 2015

R. Fröhlich

1

, C. Schöller

1

1

LMU Munich, Department of Communication Studies and Media Research, Munich, Germany

When flight 4U9525 from Barcelona to Duesseldorf disappeared from the radar screens on 24 March 2015, a team of rescuers rushed to find the plane

crashed and destroyed, with no survivors. The crash started a number of pre-planned processes outside but also inside the company which operated

the flight: Germanwings, a subsidiary of Germany’s leading carrier Lufthansa. The airline was prepared: A guideline for possible crisis, including the crash

of an airplane, helped to navigate the initial hours after the catastrophe. However, once it became clear that the co-pilot had deliberately crashed the plane,

the company’s communication staff entered unknown territory. Media coverage went through the roof and with the co-pilot’s name uncovered, there was

little left to hide. The objective of communication in a crisis seems clear: Keep harm away from the company. But is strategic crisis communication effective

at all, when emotions like shock, grief and rage are at play? To find out if and how strategic elements of Germanwings’ press material were adopted and

evaluated by the media during the crisis, we chose a two-step-methodological design: First, the press material released by Germanwings between 24

March and 31 July 2015 was analyzed using qualitative data analysis. Based on the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2010) strategic

elements of communication were identified: justification, concern, compensation, regret and apology. Second, following Baern’s (1985) assumption that

public relations determine topics and timing of media coverage, we used quantitative content analysis to search for strategic elements in 563 articles about

the crash published by German national print media. Press material is more likely to determine media coverage if it is distributed fast and is the only source

of information for journalists (Raupp, 2015). Both criteria apply to the Germanwings crash. The quantitative content analysis also allows for a detailed de‑

scription of the crisis from a media perspective. The situation Germanwings faced was a typical‘overnight crisis’(Klenk, 1989): A sudden, catastrophic event

leads to approximately two weeks of intensive media coverage, followed by a slow decline of interest. In our case, the effect of press releases on the media

coverage is strongest in the later phase of the crisis; in the first two weeks after the crash, journalists wrote about a wide variety of topics related to the crash

(14 different topics on 27 March). One month after the crash, only three main topics remained. This allowed for effective strategic communication and

for Germanwings to influence the media agenda. Germanwings’ strategic communication was effective throughout the whole crisis: 35,0 % of articles in

the study referred to their press material. The material was most likely to be cited if it contained information that was exclusively available from the compa‑

ny. Showing empathy wasn’t overly successful by quantitative means – but in 88,9 % of articles in which the company was cited showing empathy towards

the victims of the crash, the company was evaluated positively by the media. Altogether, given the circumstances, Germanwings successfully steered

the crisis by acting empathetically and responsibly.