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Friday, November 11

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W. (2009). Conceptualizing crisis communication. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 99–118). New York:

Routledge. Perrow, C. (1984). Normal Accidents. New York. Basic Books. Sellnow, D. D., Lane, D., Littlefield, R. S., Sellnow, T. L., Wilson, B., & Beauchamp, K.

(2015). A receiver-based approach to effective instructional crisis communication. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 23, 149–158. Sellnow,

D.D., & Sellnow, T. L. (2015). Instructional principles, risk communication. Encyclopedia of Health Communication. Sellnow, T. L., & Sellnow, D. D. (2010).

The instructional dynamic of risk and crisis communication: Distinguishing instructional messages from dialogue. The Review of Communication, 10(2),

111–125.

PP 343

National Perspectives on a Global Disaster: A Three-Stage Analytical Approach to German and Japanese Media Reporting on

the Fukushima Crisis

F. Meissner

1

1

Dortmund Technical University, School of International and Intercultural Communication- c/o Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism, Dortmund, Germany

According to Beck (2009), the existence of risks can be dramatized or downplayed depending on the norms that decide about what people know or don't

know in a given society. As the role of media in this process is crucial, it is significant to analyze the circumstances of news reporting on risks as well as di‑

sasters (which can be considered as risks that have become reality). This is especially the case in an age where risks and disasters are increasingly global, but

media discourses overwhelmingly remain within the framework of the nation state (Pantti, Wahl-Jorgensen & Cottle, 2012). One example for such a global

catastrophic event is the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 which stirred anxiety far beyond Japanese borders and even triggered nuclear phase-outs in

Germany (short-term) and Switzerland (long-term). At the same time, it was remarkable how differently domestic news outlets in Japan and international

media reported on the triple disaster. Some of the most striking examples of this gap can be drawn from the comparison of Japanese and German coverage.

To mention only few instances, media in Japan initially paid most attention to the earthquake and tsunami (Tanaka & Hara, 2012; Tkach-Kawasaki, 2012),

while their German counterparts focused on the crippled power plant from an early stage (Kowata et al., 2012; Hayashi, 2013). With regard to the nuclear

disaster, Japanese news reporting was shaped by calls to avoid panic and so-called "harmful rumors" (Coulmas, 2011; Yamada, 2013) and, consequently,

spent relatively little attention to risks (Schwarz, 2014). On the opposite, media in Germany were often criticized for cases of sensationalism and one-sided

reporting (Coulmas, 2011; Zöllner, 2011). The presentation argues that these differences are too profound to be attributed only to the fact that Japan was

physically affected by the catastrophe while Germany was not. Drawing on a series of expert interviews with Japanese and German scholars as well as

narrative interviews with journalists from both countries, this presentation will provide a three-stage analysis of the differences in media reporting. Firstly,

it will show how pre-existing political discourses and varying degrees of risk awareness shaped the journalists' perception of the events. Secondly, it will

identify distinct approaches to disaster reporting influencing the way how the catastrophe and its victims were portrayed. Thirdly, it will reflect on the role

of media concerning the debate about political consequences taking into consideration relevant aspects of both countries' journalism cultures. The discus‑

sion of results will be conducted with regard to the theoretical framework of Beck's "World Risk Society" and its conclusions concerning the representation

of risks by the media.

PP 344

Attributions of Responsibility and Strategies of Apology for (Mis)Managing the Refugee Crisis by the Greek Government

in Parliamentary Discourse

E. Takas

1

, N. Aspriadis

2

, A. Pittarokili

2

1

Strategic Communication & News Media Laboratory- University of Piraeus, International Relations, Piraeus, Greece

2

Strategic Communication & News Media Laboratory- University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece

In July 2015, the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Alexis Tsipras, stated that the refugee crisis is a“big crisis within a crisis”, underlying the simultaneous emer‑

gence of two large-scale crises in Greece: a) the growing refugee crisis and b) the already fragile and unstable economic situation. Greece, as an entry-point

to Europe, was faced with a rapidly growing number of refugees- more than 100.000 arrived in the first two months of 2016- with the hope to travel further

across Europe. The closing of the borders from Greece’s neighboring countries combined with voices in Europe that lead a campaign to quarantine Greece

and seal the borders, has raised debates not only regarding the European reflexes, but also regarding if (and how) Greece could cope with this refugee crisis.

Accusations of mismanagement, unavailable structures and low political reflexes have led the Greek government to an effort of reconstructing its (and

the country’s) image and re-negotiating the issue’s definition. According to Benoit (1995) the rhetorical act of apology arises as an answer to an accusation

and aims to restore the image of the accused. Strategies of denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of the event, corrective action and mor‑

tification (Benoit, 2004) are employed by political actors to deal with an accusation or an exigency and protect their reputation from damaging potentials.

Regarding the Greek government, these potentials derive not only from external sources (such as European political actors) but from internal sources as

well (such as other political parties). Furthermore, apology strategies entail references not only to the content of the accusation as a political self-defense

(Gold, 2009) but lead to attribution of responsibility for this act. This process of attribution provides the theoretical basis, for understanding, evaluating and

interpreting social surroundings (Heider, 1958) and underlines matters of issue definition. The rhetoric of blame, or “blame game”, refers to the processes

of attribution of responsibility that arise after a failure or crisis. In such a case, actors typically try to deflect their own part of responsibility and re-negotiate

the definition of the issue’s content. The research questions guiding the present research are: 1. How is the refugee crisis in Greece defined by the Greek gov‑

ernment? 2.Who is to blame for the (mis)management of the refugee crisis? 3.Which strategies of apology are present in the Greek government’s discourse?

4. To what extend do the dominant strategies of apology affect how the refugee crisis is defined by the Greek government? Discourse analysis is employed

on the official transcripts of the Greek Parliament in order to identify each observable case of apology according to Benoit’s (2004) typology of apologies and

Weiner’s (2004) typology of attributing responsibility.The combination of these typologies offer not only an insight of the rhetorical construction of apology

regarding the refugee crisis but also how this crisis is defined, regulated and demarcated.