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DCC20
Privacy, Trolls and Ethics
PP 733
The Ethics of Privacy in Sharing Culture: New Concepts and Practices
Z. Sujon
1
, L. Johnston
2
1
Regent's University London, Media and Communications, London, United Kingdom
2
City University, Journalism, London, United Kingdom
Social media platforms may have equipped users with new, quicker methods of digital communications and socialisation, but they have also opened up new
risks alongside those opportunities.This chapter draws on research looking at the ethical risks and challenges for young people operating within social spac‑
es online, particularly in relation to their understanding and perception of privacy, the ethics of sharing and tagging user-generated and curated content.
This paper seeks to add to broader understandings of what shifting ideas of privacy and related practices mean in digitally mediated environments. Many
researchers have struggled to understand shifting notions of closeness and distance which suggest the emergence of a wider permissiveness around priva‑
cy, sharing personal information (Brake 2014) and even the emergence of a publicly accepted 'intensive intimacy” (Lambert 2013). In addition, questions
about authenticity and meaning accompany almost every new platform, when they are new (Baym 2010, Marvin 1988), yet ideas of privacy appear to be
shifting from control-based notions of privacy as defined by control oriented notions of privacy as 'the claim of individuals….to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” to those shaped by public intimacy (Westin 1967: 7 as cited in Fuchs
2014: 156; Lambert 2013). While these shifts are associated with many more opportunities and risks (Livingstone 2008; Livingstone et al 2011), it seems
that the meaning of privacy is being constantly rewritten through a variety of sharing practices practices: status updates, photos, social media profiles, shar‑
ing, linking, hashtagging, commenting, data control, the rise of increasingly global mega-platforms, the emergence of mass surveillance and the pervasive
global power of sharing platforms. This paper examines what mass sharing practices mean for privacy, from the perspective of media users, practitioners
and consumers, in order to develop evidence based and conceptually relevant insights on today’s ethics of privacy. In particular, we ask what does privacy
mean for people accustomed to sharing personal information across platforms? And how do people make decisions about private and public information?
Based on qualitative (media diaries) and quantitative (survey) analysis of young people’s (18–30) experiences of privacy and a range of everyday social
platforms - from Facebook to Snapchat and from Vine to Twitter – we argue that for many there is a blurring of boundaries between what they perceive
as private and as public (Fuchs 2014; boyd 2014). This mixed methods approach enables researchers to triangulate the findings from both data collection
methods. Findings support established literature claiming that privacy in itself has a diverse range of meanings, applications and cultural implications
(Ess 2015; Zimmer 2010). In addition, online social spaces are often an extension of real time spaces, and for a large proportion of respondents, many are
unaware of the potential consequences in terms of online security, use of personal images and information and extension or reach of 'private”information.
PP 734
“Trolling”: Pathology and Ideology. The Labeling Of Deviant Online Behavior
B. Krämer
1
, N. Springer
2
1
LMU Munich, Department of Communication Studies and Media Research, Munich, Germany
2
LMU Munich, Munich, Germany
Some internet users seem to find pleasure in communicative practices others consider destructive and offensive. But how is their behavior to be classified
and interpreted? Such people are often labeled “trolls”, and their communicative practices designated as “trolling”. Meanwhile, with many different forms
of deviant online behavior being observable, trolling has become a very broad and general category. Based on the labeling approach of deviant behavior
(Becker, 1973), the aim of this contribution is to theoretically analyze the construction of“trolling”as a label for different forms of deviant online behavior.
Instead of defining some persons as trolls and studying them, we reconstruct two principal, ideal-typical conceptions of trolling we find in online contri‑
butions and media reports, and discuss their implications: 1.“Trolling”as pathological behavior: Persons communicate in a socially disruptive and insincere
way, that is, they do not mean what they say. This concept refers back to the beginning of online discussions; these sometimes fierce but often fruitful and
largely uncensored debates also attracted unproductive and antisocial behavior. It was sanctioned not with repression but by denying reciprocity (excluding
those labeled as trolls from the discourse:“Don't feed the troll!”). Social-psychological research on CMC sometimes follows this realistic conception of troll‑
ing, treating it as a measurable personality trait or observable behavior. “Trolling” can also be appropriated affirmatively. It then describes the possibly
insincere, but creative provocation of those who deserve to be unmasked or intellectually or playfully challenged. It does not conformwith norms of rational
deliberation, but is seen as useful or admirable (even by those who have been“trolled”well) because it serves a good cause or conveys an anarchic pleasure.
2. Ideology and group-focused enmity: According to this conception, trolling is hateful communication directed against groups or their (supposed) mem‑
bers. It is assumed to be sincere, inspired by real hate and to be shaped by a specific culture, milieu, or worldview (e.g., racism, sexism etc.). Partly, this moral
condemnation blends into resentment to the mere style of the“troll's”utterances and tends to exclude those who do not comply with some ideal of civilized
discourse. Emotionality and aggressiveness then seem to show the falseness of a claim. If the reasons for deviant behavior are located at the personal level,
lack of education, experience, or intelligence is seen as a basis for the vulnerability to inhuman ideologies. However, this conception is sometimes perceived
as ambivalent or even avoided because it can appear to belittle extremely offending behavior and its social or political background. Both conceptions
delegitimize and serve to discipline deviant online behavior, either by means of pathologization or referring to ideology, culture, or norms. We consider our
contribution a starting point for systematic collaborative research studying the conceptual history of the “troll”and labeling processes. Our study could be
part of a research program investigating the discursive construction of behavior and social structures related to the internet.